1 Basic ideas underlying this paper were¯rst presented in a conference to the memory of Bar-Hillel held in October 1985 at the University of Boston. Since then the framework has undergone considerable development. Various stages have been presented in lectures given during 1986 at UCLA, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford and UC Irvine, and in invited talks to a CSLI conference on self-reference (February 1987) , to the Paci¯c Division of the APA meeting (March 1987) , to a conference at the University of Texas, Austin and to the 1991 ASL meeting. The technical core of these ideas was presented in the second TARK conference (Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge) held in Monterey, March 1988, and was published in the TARK proceeding (Gaifman [1988] ). I have bene¯ted from many reactions, observations and discussions of the issues. Among the many to whom thanks are due I would like to mention, in particular, David Kaplan, Brian Skyrms, Hillary Putnam and Charles Parsons. I am also indebted to Rohit Parikh for useful comments and for¯nding a bug in one of the earlier proofs.
The mathematical part of a previous draft has been replaced here by a more informal description and an illustrative example, which, I trust, are su±cient to give a good idea of the method. I did this for reasons of length and in order to preserve a non-technical pro¯le in what is intended as a philosophical paper. I plan to present the mathematics, in full, in a seperate article.
Essentially, this puzzle is a reformulation of what van Frassen [1968] has named \The Strengthened Liar"; \The Strong Liar" is what I shall call it here. We might recall here that the usual version of the Liar paradox consists in the fact that the sentence on line 1 is neither true nor false, because either assumption leads to contradiction. That version can be resolved by admitting gaps, i.e., by giving up the rule that every sentence must be either true or false. The present paradox is an altogether di®erent kettle of¯sh. It consists in our seeming inability to express a true conclusion|namely that a certain sentence is not true|without repeating the very same sentence, or one equivalent to it.
It is known that the semantic paradoxes can be reconstructed in various modal frameworks (cf. Montague [1963] ). Indeed, using a knowledge predicate we get an analogous puzzle:
line 1 What is written on line 1 is not known by Jill to be true.
Regarding the sentence, Jill concludes that she does not know it to be true. (Her knowing it to be true would imply that it is indeed true, which, given what the sentence says, would imply that she does not know it to be true; thus|a contradiction.) Jill writes her conclusion on line 2: line 2 What is written on line 1 is not known by Jill to be true.
So Jill knows the truth of what is written on line 2, because she has just deduced it, but not of what is written on line 1.
A similar puzzle can be made with`known' replaced by`believed'. With`necessary' we get the following version:
line 1 The sentence on line 1 is not necessarily true.
line 2 The sentence on line 1 is not necessarily true.
Again, the line 1 sentence is not necessarily true; because if it were, it would not be true and, a fortiori, not necessarily true. This conclusion is necessarily true, because we have just proved it. Writing it on line 2, we get a necessarily true sentence, which merely repeats that not necessarily true sentence on line 1.
The moral of all these puzzles is simple: In situations of this nature we should assign truth-values not to sentence-types but to their tokens. Having concluded that the line 1 sentence is not true, we express this conclusion by displaying another token of the very same sentence. This second token, on line 2, expresses something altogether di®erent from what is expressed, if anything, by the token on line 1. The people who agreed with Jill in the Jack and Jill exchange had no di±culty of appreciating this point.
In this respect, modal predicates like`know',`believe' and`necessary' are in the same boat with`true' and the same remedy is required; namely: to allow di®erent tokens of the same sentence to have di®erent meanings, or|if you want|to express di®erent statements, or di®erent propositions. One should expect the formalisms to di®er according to the predicates in question, but the same general framework will underlie them. In the present work we set up the formalism for truth, thereby providing also the basic framework for the various modalities.
Following the intuition just given, we can see that in general what a token expresses depends on (1) what it says, i.e., on the sentence type and (2) on the whole network: on the tokens that the sentence refers to and on the tokens that they in their turn refer to, etc. This is what distinguishes the self-referential sentence-token on line 1 from its non-self-referential brother on line 2.
I shall propose a formal setup for specifying networks of tokens and an algorithm for assigning truth-values. It assigns the sentence-token on line 1 the value GAP , that on line 2 | the value T (True) and it yields the same kind of intuitive results in general.
I base the formalism on three truth-values T , F and GAP. The¯rst two of which are referred to as the standard truth-values
The third is not merely an \unde¯ned". It signi¯es not only an absence of a standard value, but recognized failure. The idea is that we assign a tokens, or|as we shall later see| pointers, the value GAP when, in the course of the evaluation, we conclude that they must fail, i.e., that the rules will not enable us to assign them T or F. We can then go on and use other, \uninfected" tokens to assert of a previously failed token that it is not true, or not false, or that it is neither true nor false. By making GAP an active value we can construct on top of the gap instead falling into it. Now, the concept of a token is too narrow for the purpose of a general framework. For we might want to refer to sentences without having them displayed somewhere as tokens. Suppose that there is just one sentence on line n, then we can use`the negation of the sentence on line n' in order to refer to the negation of that sentence, independently of there being a token of the negation. And, in general, we might speak about the sentence obtained from that on line n by any syntactic manipulation, e.g., the substitution of some term by another. Therefore I use a more general concept, that of a pointer. A pointer is any object that is used to point to some object.
A token constitutes a special kind of pointer, it points to the type of which it is a token.
In general, pointing is determined by a variety of conventions. Being a pointer is not something intrinsic in an object, but amounts solely to its functioning in a certain role. Any object can serve. If desired, we can regard descriptions as pointers to the described objects. And one can set up a formalism whereby every sentence-type is a pointer to itself. However, the solution to the semantic paradoxes requires that we have many pointers to the same sentence-type, so that when a pointer fails another is available.
As noted, any object can be pointed to. But since in this paper only pointers to sentencetypes are needed, I shall reserve`pointer' for this case, unless the context indicates otherwise.
It is useful not to enter, at this stage, into the nature of pointers, but to take them as primitives. Thus, I assume a language, a set of objects called \pointers", which have names in that language, and some¯xed arbitrary function that correlates with each pointer a sentence (of that very same language) to which it points. A pointer whose name occurs in some sentence can point to any sentence whatsoever; all possibilities of direct or indirect self-reference are thus covered.
Only the following additional structural elements are needed for the pointer system. A correlation that correlates with each pointer to a compound sentence pointers to its sentential components. Thus any p pointing to A¤B, where ¤ is a sentential connective, has correlated pointers p1 and p2, which point, respectively, to A and to B. And if p points to the negation :A, then p1 points to A (and we can, in this case, stipulate that p2 = p1). We call p1 and p2 the derived pointers of p. If the language has quanti¯ers, we correlate also with every p, which points to 8vA(v) or to 9vA(v), and with every constant term t, a derived pointer pjt, which points to A(t) (the result of substituting t for v in A(v)).
Note that if p is a token, then p1 and p2 can be simply identi¯ed with the corresponding subtokens. But with quanti¯ers we must go beyond tokens, for in general we cannot identify pjt with a token.
For our present purposes, as long as quanti¯ers are not included, we can take our pointers to be just tokens. The reader may, for the sake of convenience, assume this to be the case. Extending it to the more general case is straightforward.
The upshot of this approach is a new kind of semantics in which truth-values are assigned to pointers and the usual recursive de¯nition of truth is replaced by a set of rules for evaluating networks.
Here is an informal description of the algorithm, illustrated by a simple example. This, I think, should give an adequate idea of the method, providing thereby a basis for the philosophical discussion that follows. (A full mathematical presentation is planned for a seperate companion paper. A concise version containing the formal de¯nitions and the statements, without proofs, of the main theorems can be found in [Gaifman 1988 ].)
Consider the above mentioned system of language and pointers. Assume that the language (based on predicates and, possibly, function symbols) is interpreted, except for two, so-called truth predicates (or semantic predicates): T r( ) | for`true' and F a( ) | for`false'. These two predicates take pointer-names as arguments.
Assuming that p, q, r, etc. are pointers, and that the pointer names used in this discussion are also their names in the formal language, we get sentences of the form T r(p), F a(q), etc., where p, q, etc., are pointers to sentences in this very same language.
The goal is an assignment of truth-values to all the pointers. It is achieved by the algorithm|also called the evaluation procedure|which is based on a collection of rules for assigning truth-values. The rules are naturally divided into various groups. The of socalled standard rules, which make up the¯rst group, correspond to the traditional rules for assigning standard values (i.e., T or F), including the classical rules for the truth predicates.
Standard Rules: Pointers to sentences of the form P (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ), where P is a nonsemantic predicate, get their truth-values in the usual way, via the interpretation of the predicates and the denoting terms. Such sentences are called basic. Evidently, di®erent pointers to the same basic sentence get the same truth-value. It is a standard value determined by sentence-type alone. And this holds, as long as only standard rules are employed. Now, if p points to a non-basic sentence, then, in the usual order of things, its value is determined by the values of other pointers, which, so to speak, are called directly by p. Thus, if p points to the disjunction A _ B, then the pointers it calls directly are de¯ned to be its derived pointers p1 and p2 (which, recall, point to A and to B). If one of them gets the value T, so does p|no matter whether the other has been assigned a value, or what that value is. If both get F, p gets F as well. The standard rule for negation, i.e., the \toggling" of the standard truth-value, should be obvious. Other connectives are treated by expressing them in terms of _ and :.
A pointer, p, to a quanti¯ed sentence, calls directly each of the pointers pjt to the substitution instances. The rules for quanti¯ed sentences are obtained by treating them as (possibly in¯nite) disjunctions, or conjunjctions. For the sake simplicity, all objects in the universe of interpretation are assumed to be named by constant term, and quanti¯ers are interpreted substituionally. This assumption is not essential. Quanitiers can be interpreted referentially at the cost of some additional structural items 2 . Finally, a pointer to T r(q), or to F a(q), calls directly q; if q gets a standard value, then p gets, in the¯rst case | the same value, in the second case | the opposite value. These are the standard rules for the truth predicates.
The essential part of the algorithm, by which it enhances classical logic, is constituted by two additional groups: The gap rules determine the cases of failure, calling for the assignment of where GAP. The jump rules determine assignments of standard-values, which are based on previous failures. They enable us to use new pointers in order to make semantic assertions about previously failed ones (e.g., that they are not true, or that they are not false, or neither true nor false). Before I go into these two groups, here is a rather simple illustrative example.
Let John, Joan, Jack and Jill make the following statements: For simplicity, we can use here each speaker as a pointer to his uttered sentence. The resulting network is represented in Fig. 1 . The arrows between pointers (the nodes) do not represent the pointing, which is a relation between pointers and sentence-types, but the above mentioned direct calls between pointers. McX's conjecture, represented as a box, is not spelled out. It might involve a whole network of its own; but I assume, for the purpose of illustration, that it does not refer, directly or indirectly, to any of the four utterences.
Actually, the diagram has been simpli¯ed by merging certain arrows and hiding certain derived pointers; e.g., the arrow from John to Jill should be split into an arrow from John to John1 (which points to the the¯rst conjunct of what John says), an arrow from John1 to John11 (which points to \What Jill says is true") and an arrow from John11 to Jill. Note that the sentence-types to which the pointers point can be read from the diagram though they are not explicitly displayed.
Fig. 1
The algorithm is applied recursively. Assume that it results in assigning F to McX. This leaves Jack and Jill in a closed unresolved loop. Both get at this stage the value GAP. Then Joan who makes an assertion about Jill and does not belong to the loop gets a standard (T or F) value (here a jump rule is employed). Since her assertion is true, she gets T. In the same way, the¯rst conjunct in John's assertion gets T. But the second conjunct (which asserts the non-truth of Joan) gets F, hence John gets F.
Had McX gotten T, Jack and Jill would have gotten T, while John and Joan would have gotten F.
In the case of the Two Line puzzle the network is:
For`i' read:`the sentence-token on line i'. Right at the beginning we get a closed loop consisting of the pointer 1. It gets the value GAP. Then 2 gets the value T.
In the Four Speaker example, the standard rules for T r and for negation are used for determining the value of John2 (which points to the second conjunct of what John says). Also the standard rule for conjunctions is used for determining the value of John. The additional rule groups are as follows.
Gap Rules: The most important of these is the closed loop rule, which states the following: If, in the course of applying the evaluation procedure, a closed unevaluated loop forms and none of its members can be assigned a standard value by any of the rules, then all of its members are assigned GAP in a single evaluation step.
[A closed unevaluated loop is a set, say L, of unevaluated pointers (i.e., which have not been assigned truth-values), such that: (1) Unevaluated pointers called directly by any member of L also belong to L and (2) From each member of L one can reach any other member of L by one, or more,¯nitely many direct calls; i.e, by a sequence p 1 ; : : : ; p n , where n > 1, the p i s are in L and each calls directly its successor.]
In the Four Speaker example, Jack and Jill get their value via the closed loop rule. And in the Two Line example this rule applies to the token on line 1, which forms by itself a closed unevaluated loop. In both examples the loops are simple cycles. But, in general, the closed unevaluated loop can be as complex as you can imagine and might consist of any number,¯nite or in¯nite, of pointers.
There is also a simple gap rule that states: A pointer is assigned GAP if all pointers called directly by it have been assigned values, but the pointer cannot be assigned a standard value by any of the rules 3 4 .
Jump Rules: Assume that q points to T r(p), or to F a(p), and that p, but not q, has already been assigned GAP; then the jump rules assign q the value F. Consequently, if an unevaluated r points to :Tr(p) or to :Fa(p)), where p has been assigned GAP, then, by a jump rule, r1 (which points to T r(p) or to F a(p)) gets F and, by the standard negation rule, r gets T. Thus, the jump rules provide for the possibility of successfully asserting that 3 Given the standard rules, the e®ect of this rule is to enforce Kleene's strong three-valued truth tables: A pointer p to a disjunction A _ B is assigned GAP if p1 and p2 have been assigned values that do not enable us to assign, by some other rule, a standard value to p; this is the case where one of p1; p2 is assigned GAP and the other is assigned either GAP or F. However, in other variants, based on changing the standard rules (e.g., using supervaluations) the simple gap rule does not imply Kleene's strong truth-tables. 4 The gap rules determine the assignments of GAP that signify recognized failures. However, GAP can be assigned also by an additional so called give-up rule: If at some stage we are left with unevaluated pointers to which none of the other rules apply, then all of them are assigned GAP . Gaps assigned by this rule do not constitute recognized failures, but are rather like Kripke's \unde¯ned" u. It can be shown that in all networks of¯nitary type, i.e., where every pointer calls (directly, or indirectly)¯nitely many pointers, the give-up rule is never employed. The aim of more sophisticated versions of the algorithm is to avoid, as far as possible, the employment of such a rule in non-¯nitary networks. a given GAP -pointer is not true, or that it is not false. \Jump" signi¯es here true ascent in the metalinguistic hierarchy.
In our example, a jump rule (for T r) is needed, in order to assign Joan and John1 their values. It is also invoked for assigning a value to the line 2 token in the Two Line puzzle.
To sum up, the assignment of GAP signi¯es recognised failure: We decide that the pointers in question fail to evaluate to a standard value. The grounds for such a decision are given in the gap rules. The assignment of GAP can serve as a basis for further assignments of standard values via the jump rules. What is inexpressible in the usual denotational semantics is thus expressible through network evaluation.
Various mathematical results, which I shall not go into here, establish the desirable properties of the evaluation procedure. I shall only describe informally two of the basic results, whose signi¯cance can, I hope, be seen:
Order Independence: The rules can be applied in any order, to whatever pointers; the (possibly trans¯nite) sequence of applications results in a unique total valuation which does not depend on the order of applications 5 .
Limited Pointer Dissent (abbreviated as LPD): Two pointers to the same sentence are assigned di®erent values only if one of the pointers is assigned GAP . This is also true for pointers pointing to logically equivalent sentences.
The evaluation procedure, called also`algorithm', has indeed the form of an algorithm: an exact prescription for applying a well-de¯ned set of rules. But this \algorithmic" form should not diguise its true potential. It applies to all networks, including in¯nite ones of arbitrary cardinality, and it extends both Tarski's and Kripke's systems. Each of these is obtained by deleting from my algorithm certain rules: Tarski's truth de¯nition is what we get if we employ only the standard rules for basic sentences and for connectives and quanti¯ers (and assign GAP to all pointers that are left at the end unevaluated). Kripke's system is obtained if we restrict ourselves to the standard rules, including the standard rules for the truth predicates.
It can be shown that if the jump rule is deleted, then a pointer's value depends only on the sentence it points to; truth-values would be thus determined by sentence-types alone.
Note that, in Kripke's construction, both tokens in the Two Line puzzle constitute gaps (i.e., remain unevaluated), as do the utterences of the four speakers. In the variants of Gupta and Herzberger they are assigned oscilating values.
One could say that the two major points of di®erence between the present proposal and all the previous ones are:¯rst, the use of pointers and second, the employment of the gap and jump rules.
Recovering The Metalanguage Hierarchy
There is a precise de¯nition, based on the evaluation procedure, which correlates with each pointer an ordinal number expressing an intuitive notion of \metalinguistic level". The pointers can be thus strati¯ed so as to re°ect a Tarski-like hierarchy.
Roughly speaking, a pointer's level is the number of nested applications of jump rules, needed in order to evaluate the pointer. In the Four Speaker example, if ® is the level of McX, then also Jack and Jill are on level ®, whereas John and Joan are on level ® + 1.
We can also re¯ne each of our levels so as to re°ect a minor, or local subhierarchy within it. Roughly speaking, the minor subhierarchy measures the height of nested applications of the standard rules for the truth predicates.
Unlike Tarski's hierarchy, we have a single language with a single truth-predicate and the strati¯cation is e®ected after fact, i.e., after the assignment of truth-values. In this respect it is like the hierarchy obtained via Kripke's construction; as he aptly puts it: the pointers (in his case|sentences) seek their own levels. But his whole hierarchy of grounded sentneces corresponds (exactly) to our local subhierarchy of level 0. Real climbing starts where Kripke leaves o®. All our non-zero levels are in his model gaps (\unde¯ned").
The construal of truth as a predicate over pointers rather than types is related to the metalinguistic hierarchy as follows. Call pointers dissenting if they point to the same sentence and have di®erent truth-values. We know, by LPD, that of two dissenting pointers one is assigned GAP; it turns out that the non-GAP pointer is one level higher in the hierarchy: Higher Level Dissent (abbreviated as HLD): Whenever p 1 and p 2 are dissenting pointers, if l(p i is p i s level and p 1 is the GAP pointer, then l(p 2 ) = l(p 1 ) + 1.
The signi¯cance of LPD and HLD will be discussed in section ??.
Before proceeding let me clarify certain points, answering thereby possible questions and allaying, perhaps, certain misgivings that might have arisen. Some of these points will be reconsidered, at greater detail, in later sections.
What Pointers Express: Some have found the idea of assigning truth-value to pointers strange; the phrase`that pointer is true' may sound bizarre. Truth and falsity, so it is argued, have to do with what we say. Surely it is inappropriate to attribute them to some arbitrary objects, merely by virtue of their pointing function? To argue thus is to misunderstand the present proposal. The phrasing is not essential. It is not strange to speak of the truth or falsity of sentences, meaning thereby sentence-tokens; and if it comes to pointers, one could speak of a pointer pointing to a truth, or to a falsity, or indicating one, or failing to indicate a truth, or a falsity. We can regard pointers as means of expression.
As far as the ontology of statements, propositions, meanings, etc. is concerned, my proposal is neutral. A nominalist who bars intensional entities can use something like the evaluation procedure as part of the account of the functioning of language. But the proposal is compatible with seeing pointers (in the contexts of networks) as means of expressing propositions, or statments 6 . On a pretheoretic level, it is not di±cult to make sense of \the proposition expressed", or \the statement made" by means of a pointer. For example, what is expressed by the sentence-token on line 2 is simply that the sentence-token on line 1 is not true, which is to say: is not assigned the value T by the evaluation procedure. Although the token on line 1 is of the same sentence-type, it fails, because of the loop, to express this. Similarly, in the Jack and Jill exchange, Jack says of himself that he does not express a proposition, but in this very saying no proposition is expressed, or|at least|no proposition that says this. What Jack seems|but has failed|to express is successfully expressed by Jill. If only sentence-types are considered, Jack and Jill appear to have stated the same thing. Actually they did not. The source of the illusion is that they employed sentence-types that are, in the given conversational context, logically equivalent.
The following can perhaps add clari¯cation. Two intuitive theses about truth lead to the Strong Liar:
(T1) If the sentence`x is not true' is true, then x is not true.
(T2) If x is not true, then the sentence`x is not true' is true.
Here`x' ranges over sentence-types. We get the Strong Liar when x is, or is equivalent to, x is not true'. But if we construe`true' as a predicate of pointers, then`x' should range over pointers and (T1) and (T2) should be modi¯ed by replacing`the sentence' by:`any pointer to the sentence'. We can still maintain (T1) in its new form, but we have to qualify (T2) by rewriting it as:
is not true then any unfailed pointer to`x is not true' is true.
The paradox is thus blocked by allowing pointers (and, in particular, tokens) to fail, and by giving up (T2) for failed tokens of`x is not true'. If we apply the analogous strategy to types, when x is a Liar sentence, it is the type`x is not true' which fails; therefore one cannot use it to say that x is not true. Further observations concerning pointers and propositions are made in section ??.
An Essentially Non-Tarskian Semantics: In Tarskian semantics, truth is a property of sentence-types; tokens as such are not considered. That tokens play a central role in natural language, due to the abundance of indexicals and demonstratives (words like`I', you',`now',`this'`that') is, of course, very old news. But it would seem that the Tarskian framework can adjusted, or rather supplemented, so as to handle phenomena like indexicality. The dependence of truth-value on tokens, can|in such cases|be traced to the shifting denotations of indexical phrases. Having replaced (presumably, in some systematic way) these items by others, whose denotations, within the considered discourse, are not contextsensitive, we can then apply Tarskian semantics. To use an admittedly simple example, transform`He is tall' to`X is tall', where`X' is an appropriate context-insensitive name, or description, of the indicated person, and evaluate the result as a sentence-type. If needed, a further reduction can be used to eliminate the temporal indexicality of`is'. The truth predicate which is de¯ned over tokens is thus reduced to a predicate de¯ned µ a la Tarski over types. The present situation is altogether di®erent. The predicate de¯ned by the evaluation procedure is irreducibly over tokens, or|more generally|over pointers 7 . As I will later show, di®erences in truth-value that derive from di®erences of token-place in referential the network, cannot be traced in any way to indexical-like, or other ambiguously denoting terms that occur inside these tokens.
Attempts like Burge's [1979] to resolve the semantic paradoxes by construing`true' as an indexical cannot but fail to achieve that goal. Indeed, as the analysis will show, Burge's account puts all the burden of work on a rather obscure mechanism of implicatures, leaving indexicality idle. The general argument concerning indexicality is laid out in section ??; the more speci¯c discussion of Burge's work is in section ??.
The departure from Tarskian paradigm is signi¯cant in that it shows how modeling, radically di®erent from standard compositional semantics, can be formally handled in a way as precise as Tarski's truth de¯ntion for formal languages. An argument propounded by Davidson has it that the ability of¯nite beings|such as humans|to use a potentially in¯nite number of sentences is to be explained by assuming a¯nite number of rules 8 , whereby meanings of compound expressions are determined by the meanings of their components. A setup of this nature resembles Tarski's truth-de¯nition. That something of the kind underlies a great deal of the functioning of language cannot be doubted. But it is equally true that a great deal lies beyond it. If human ability for controling a potential in¯nity is to be modeled by a formal device|a plausible working assumption, though far from an axiom|then the appropriate concept is that of an algorithm. A¯nitely axiomatized compositional semantics amounts to a rather special kind of algorithm. Appealing as the model is, it is more than plausible that the processing of language, on the level of meaning, involves also algorithms of quite a di®erent nature. I shall say more on this score in section ??.
Truth, Falsity and GAP:
In the pointer formalism the predicates representing truth and falsity¯gure as two primitives. However, the evaluation rules relate truth and falsity, through negation, as follows: A pointer to the negation :A gets the value T, or the value F, i® the derived pointer to A gets the opposite value. Thus, our concept of falsity accords with the well known thesis, according to which a sentence is false i® its negation is true. It is possible to set up an equivalent formalism which uses only T r, or only F a, as a primitive 9 .
Let`false 1 ' denote falsity in the sense employed here. Another way of relating falsity to truth is given by`false 2 ': A sentence is false 2 just when it is not true.
10 Consequently, every sentence is either true or false 2 . The truth-value gaps disappear miraculoulsly, when one reads`false' as`false 2 '. In fact they have only been camou°aged, and they can be easily unmasked: A sentence is a gap if and only if both it and its negation are false 2 . As far as expressive power is concerned, the systems based on the two interpretation of falsity are equivalent; there are obvious translations from one terminology to the other. A formalism based on`false 2 , which is equivalent to the present one, can be set up at some cost of additional structure 11 .
Cases in which a sentence and an apparent negation of it are both false are provided by Russell's theory of descriptions. E.g., (i)`the present king of France is bald' and (ii)`the present king of France is not bald'
12 . This however, is due to the restricted scope of`not' in the reconstruction of (ii). There is no gap here. For true negation|one that applies to the whole sentence|does convert falsity to truth: \It is not the case that the the present king of France is bald" is true. Much of the appeal of Russell's theory is due to its ability to distinguish between local negation, as exempli¯ed in (ii), and true negation, expressible bỳ It is not the case that ...' . Whether accepted or not, Russell's theory rests squarely within the framework of classical two-valued logic.
The present situation is altogether di®erent. One cannot explain the \falsity" (i.e., nontruth) of the line 1 sentence (in the Two Line puzzle) by appealing to the scope of`not'. For we can write on line 1: It is not the case that the sentence on line 1 is true. And this sentence (type or token, the distinction does not matter here) should be a gap. For let x be this sentence; then if it is false, so is the sentence`x is true'. Hence both`x is true' and`it is not the case that x is true' are taken to be false; as counterintuitive as the anlogous case of (i) and (iii). (And, of course, taking that sentence to be true fares even worse.) Formally, one can construe`false' as`false 2 ', without incurring a contradiction. But this is no more than a lexical gap-masking device; it is certainly a far cry from classical two-valued logic.
There is a moral in this concerning propositions. Either we say that Liar type sentences express no propositions, or we make place for propositions that constitute truth-value gaps.
for pointers: A negation operant that associates with every pointer p a pointer, say neg(p), to the negation of the sentence pointed to by p. We can then translate F a(p) into T r(neg(p)). (We should stipulate that neg(p)1 = p and that if p points to a negation then neg(p1) = p). Note that, in general, neg(p) will not be a token, even if p is. The present formalism avoids the need for a negation operant; hence, unless we consider quanti¯ers, we can assume that all our pointers are just tokens.
10 This reading of`false' is adopted by Barwise and Ethchemendy in [BE 87] . The same reading, for the case of atomic senteces`¿ is ©', where ¿ is a (possibly non-denoting) description, is suggested in in [Kaplan 1970]) .
11 We shall need a negation operant for pointers, cf. footnote ??. 12 I am ignoring here the more radical Russellian position according to which de¯nite descriptions are incomplete symbols to be eliminated, in the¯nal account, altogether.
The Liar and the Truth Teller: The algorithm described so far treats the Truth Teller (a sentence asserting its own truth, e.g.,`What I am saying now is true') in the same way as the Liar, both get GAP . Our framework does, however, provide means for distinguishing between the two. The distinction is made by considering consistent assignment of truthvalues, or what we call in the technical paper self-supporting valuations. There is a total self-supporting valuation which assigns the Truth Teller (token) the value T; and there is also one which assigns it F. But every self-supporting total valuation must assign the Liar (token) the value GAP . (Roughly speaking, a self-supporting total valuation is one that is closed under rule applications: applying to it the rules of the algorithm yields the same valuation. For reasons of space, I cannot elaborate on this here.)
Di®erent Variants of the Algorithm:
The present variant of the algorithm leads to an assignment that conforms to Kleene's three-valued truth-tables (cf. footnote ??). We might, however, prefer to assign all (pointers to) tautologies the value T, e.g., any pointer to A ! A, or to A _ :A. This can be achieved by using a variant in which the set of standard rules is replaced by another set, based on so-called supervaluations. In the usual supervaluation method|which applies to sentence-types|a sentence is given a standard value when it gets this value in all possible complete standard extensions of the partial valuation de¯ned so far. This idea can be adopted to assignments of values to pointers; I defer details to the technical paper.
It is noteworthy that only the standard rules have to be changed in order to obtain the supervaluation variant; the gap and jump rules, remain the same. (Changing the standard rules can a®ect the applicability of other rules, because certain rules have preconditions requiring the inaplicability of other rules. The rules themselves, however, need no change.) This is also true in the case of other variants and it illustrates the modular character of the evaluation procedure. We can augment or change one of the rule groups without touching the remaining ones.
More sophisticated variants, not to be presented here, incorporate additional gap rules; the idea being that sometimes we can assign GAP by recognizing ahead the eventual failure of certain pointers. This makes it possible to apply the jump rules on a wider scope and, thus, to reduce the total assignments of GAP. Some of these versions call for distinctions between various kinds of pointers, to be expressed formally by apropriate enrichments of the pointer formalism. These variants are aimed at achieving higher degrees of self-contained systems for some highly expressive languages|a goal that will become clearer in the next section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I try to put the present proposal in wider perspective. I de¯ne the concept of a black hole in order to bring out the essential problem posed by the Strong Liar and its kin, and to clarify the goals of the proposal and the motives for setting up more sophisticated versions of the algorithm. Section ?? is devoted mainly to showing that`true' is a non-indexical predicate over tokens (or, generally, over pointers) and to the import of a non-Tarskian semantics. Section ?? contains some observations concerning pointers and propositions, and comments on some aspects of the Barwise-Etchemendy work. In section ?? I discuss three previous accounts of the Strong Liar those of Parsons (or Russel-Parsons) Burge and Skyrms.
Black Holes
Let us extend the original two line text as follows:
line 1 The sentence on line 1 is not true. Suppose that we assign truth-values to sentence-types. Then the sentences on line 1 and 2 are equivalent, being the same. Moreover, if the sentences on lines k ¡ 1 and k are equivalent then we can derive the equivalence of the sentences on lines k and k + 1 from the following mild assumption: If`...' and`' refer to equivalent sentences, then`... is not true' is equivalent to`is not true'
13 . Hence all the sentences are equivalent. Since the sentence on line 1 is not true, the sentence on line 3 is also not true, but what I have just stated is not true, because it is the sentence on line 4 (or an obviously equivalent reformulation of it), and also this last statement of mine is not true, because it is the sentence on line 5, etc. None of these sentences can be successfully asserted, because none of them is true; but again I¯nd myself slipping into non-truth: What I have just said is not true for it obviously includes the conjunction of these very same sentences; and also this last assertion is not true, and so on ad in¯nitum.
The innocent looking gap has developed into a black hole that sucks into itself every sentence asserting that some sentence in the hole is not true 14 .
Formally, a hole-hierarchy is de¯nable as follows:`S' is a 0-hole if it is a gap and, by induction:`S' is an n + 1-hole if it is an n-hole and``S' is true' and``S' is false' are gaps. Then`S' is a black hole if it is an n-hole for all n.
We shall use`hole', unquali¯ed to denote a 1-hole. Thus, we cannot assert of a hole that it is not true, or not false, or a gap (neither true nor false), without this second assertion being itself a gap.
Of course, syntactical properties can be asserted of any sentence. But no information about the truth-value of a hole can be conveyed directly. And as for black holes, they are semantic untouchables. No semantic information about them can be conveyed in any way, be it as indirect and across as many layers as one may wish.
Actually, the arguments produced so far in the case of our example imply only that the sentence on line 1 is a \semi black hole"; we have only iterated`...is not true' but not`...is not false'.
15 This is however bad enough. And it becomes a fully°edged black hole, under some additional very natural assumptions. In particular, it is easily seen that every gap is a black hole if we assume that`S' and``S' is true' are equivalent, under an equivalence relation satisfying Leibnitz's substitutivity law 16 (Note that this is not the Tarski biconditional:`S' is true$ S, but only the requirement that``S' is true' and`S' should get the same truth-value, including GAP .) It is di±cult to see how this equivalence can be avoided if truth-values depend only on sentence-types. Indeed, the equivalence holds in the systems of Kripke et al, and those of Gupta and Herzberger. Every truth value gap is a black hole in these systems.
When truth-values depend only on types, black holes are thus bound to occur on the most elementary levels of language. (Think how little is needed to produce sentences like the sentence on line 1.) Within such a system the little game I have just played, of repeatedly refuting myself by trying to assert the \unassertable", signi¯es a genuine metaphysical mystery. All this, in spite of the fact that the trick is quite transparent and that we, Jack and Jill included, have no trouble at all of asserting this sort of \unassertable" by employing another token of the very same paradoxical sentence. Linguistic usage includes a mechanism for overcoming the black-hole dilemma. And if our goal is to model natural language, or a basic aspect of it, by a formal language containing so to speak its own truth predicate, then the elimination of black holes|at least those of the simpler varieties| should be an overriding concern. Failure in this respect means that we have failed to capture something very essential to the functioning of language.
15 Our minimal assumptions (cf.,. the preceding footnote) do not imply that`The sentence on line 1 is false' is a gap. This can be shown by constructing a model, to be sure, a highly pathological one, satisfying the minimal assumptions, in which this last sentence is false.
16 That is to say, the equivalence of`S 1 ' and`S 2 ' entails that of``S 1 ' is true' and``S 2 ' is true' and similarly for`false'. Actually, for the sentence on line n to be a black hole a weaker assumption than the equivalence of`S' and \S' is true' will su±ce. E.g., for n = 2 the assumption is that \S' is true' is equivalent to`\S' is true' is true'. For larger n one iterates`is true' accordingly; the assumption becomes weaker with each iteration.
Though Kripke notices the failure, he plays it down, not giving the issue the central place it deserves 17 . \The sense (so he writes) in which we can say, in a natural language, that a Liar sentence is not true must be thought of as associated with a later stage in the development of natural language, one in which the speakers re°ect on the generation process leading to the minimal¯xed point."
Indeed, the nontruth of the sentence on line 1 hinges on a sort of metareasoning. But this does not place the assertion on line 2 at a \later stage in the development of natural language." Certainly not at a stage that comes after the construction of the minimal¯xed point, an inductive process that moves through all recursive ordinals! The fact that, after carrying out this trans¯nite construction, we are still left with the elementary problem of making sense of what Jack and Jill said shows that, far from having completed a home run, we are still at base one.
The basic (and simplest) version of my proposal eliminates the holes in all situations of¯nitary type|those in which every pointer calls only¯nitely many pointers 18 . To this type of network, which I call locally¯nite, belong all the tangled loops that can arise when nitely many people make assertions about each other, provided that altogether¯nitely many assertions are involved. In particular, it contains the examples discussed in the literature. The absence of holes is formally expressed by the following result, which holds for locallȳ nite networks under quite general conditions 19 : If p has the value GAP then there is a pointer q to the sentence :T r(p)^:F a(p) (i.e., the sentence asserting that p is a gap), such that q has the value T.
This means that we can successfully assert, of any gap, that it is a gap. Another result, which applies under the same conditions, states that every sentence has a pointer to it that has a standard (T or F) value. (Recall that, by LPD, pointers to the same sentence must agree in value if their values are standard.)
When the language is su±ciently expressive, then in some situations of in¯nitary type, holes, even black holes, appear. Of these, some can be eliminated by more sophisticated versions of the algorithm and it appears that further improvements are possible. It is far from clear how far one can go towards the elimination of holes. In the context of mathematical languages the elimination of holes will bring us near to what one might consider a \universal language" | a self-contained system, one that includes its own semantics. For this reason alone it is highly plausible that rich languages must have holes. Note, however, that we have no formal proof of this. The standard argument from the Liar is no longer valid for setups of the kind proposed here. But perhaps the question of proof should not even be raised at the present stage, since it is not clear what the present proposal might, in further developments, encompass.
In the broader perspectives of natural language \hole like" phenomena are bound to occur. Some discourses take us to the edge of meaning, whereby we are tempted to express the inexpressible or to think the unthinkable. Holes are perhaps the inevitable price for a powerful language capable of evolving. Indeed, some situations can be described only by saying that we have changed the language, or that we have altered the very fabric of our conceptual framework. But I do not think that the Jack and Jill exchange calls for such a description. Here we can at least tidy up the more elementary levels of language.
A comparison with set theory comes naturally to mind. The analogy between the semantical and set theoretical paradoxes is obvious and well known. Russell considered them to be of a kind and proposed to solve them along the the same lines 20 . His solution is based on a rigid predetermined classi¯cation of sets, which makes room only for quantifying over sets of the same type, not over sets in general. The hierarchy is¯xed. It is incorporated into language itself. Axiomatic set theory, say ZF, has disposed of the built-in hierarchy, replacing the aggregate of concepts set-of-type-i by a single concept of set.
Russell's hierarchy of sets parallels his hierarchy of propositions, of which Tarski's hierarchy of metalanguages is a close relative. The representation of Tarski's hierarchy in a formal system yields an aggregate of truth predicates true i , where i ranges over some list xed in advance, but no single true. Viewed from that perspective, adequate formal systems that contain their own truth predicate should do for semantics what ZF does for intuitive set theory. Now, axiomatic set theory is a system in which mathematics can be rigurously formalized. And, as long as mathematical statements are interpreted in structures that are sets, their truth-values can be de¯ned within set theory by the usual (Tarskian) truth de¯nition. A closer look shows that the metalinguistic hierarchy is thus subsumed under the set-theoretical hierarchy, obtained by iterating the power-set operation. The problems resurge when the structures in question are no longer sets; in particular, when truth in \Cantor's universe" is considered. In this respect, axiomatic set theory has not solved the problems arising out of the set theoretical paradoxes. It has shifted them to the theory's fringes; where they are of no concern, except to set theoreticians who investigate the theory's borders and who try to express the \true picture of Cantor's universe" by adopting strong in¯nity axioms 21 . Given this perspective, it is natural to try to construct highly expressive formal languages containing their own truth predicate, wherein the presence of black holes is minimal. Unlike set theory, pointer semantics draws on insights derived from natural language rather than mathematical thought. Nonetheless, it results in systems that are as formally precise as any piece of mathematics. The present work can be seen as a¯rst step that eliminates black holes at the basic linguistic level. If we include in the language an arithmetical machinery that makes possible a syntactic representation of the language within itself, µ a la GÄ odel, and if, treating pointers as numbers, we include also means of describing in the language the pointing relation, then black holes can be constructed in a variety of ways. Attempts to eliminate them lead to more sophisticated versions of the algorithm and to some intricate, interesting questions. Thus, pointer semantics, which formalises mechanisms inherent in linguistic practice, gives also rise to foundational questions of logic.
Tokens and Types
Let me start by a commonplace observation: when a child learns a language he encounters rst of all tokens of linguistic entities. The displaying of tokens under certain circumstances may a®ect the environment in which the displaying takes place. The child acquires the language by learning the e®ects of token-display and by participating in the token-display game. This observation does not prove that tokens are prior (in some nontrivial sense) to types; for the ability to learn the language is preconditioned by the ability to recognize token similarity and, thereby, to classify tokens according to type. The observation is made in order to point out the obvious fact that there are many ways of passing information by means of an interactive game-like process. A useful description of the game must, inevitably, ignore through abstraction various aspects. Else we shall be submerged under sheer detail 22 . Of course, we may ignore only inasmuch as this does not restrict us essentially when it comes to making sense of what is going on. There are thus two con°icting requirements: That the account we give be su±ciently simple, and that it be adequate for handling a broad enough class of applications. Usually there is trade-o® between the two.
The¯xing on sentence-types as on the basic truth carrier units seems an obvious natural move. Besides making for the enormous simpli¯cation of abstracting away tokens, it clears the path for a compositional semantics. Linguistic entities are analysed thereby as complexes whose meanings derive in a systematic way from that of their components, via certain, relatively few recursive rules. The truth-value of a sentence is thus determined recursively; the context in which the sentence occurs can be completely ignored. A description of this kind¯ts accurately formal languages constructed by logicians; which is no wonder, since it is the very principle on which such languages are constructed. The picture does not¯t natural languages, where context dependencies abound, due to indexicals, demonstratives, and ambiguous terms. Nonetheless, it re°ects a very essential aspect of natural language. For if the dependency of truth-value on context can be traced to context-sensitive particles (noun-phrases and predicates) then, once these particles have been disambiguated|how, is another matter| we can de¯ne the truth values by using the above mentioned recursive rules 23 . I will now show that such a picture cannot account for those aspects of language that revolve on its containing its own truth predicate. To draw it in sharper detail, assume p and q to be dissenting sentence-tokens, i.e., tokens of the same sentence-type whose truth-values di®er. Then, according to the picture, the dissent is due to the presence of certain terms in the sentence, say t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : ; t n , whose references di®er on the two occasions. If we are to replace each t i by a suitable t 0 i , which denotes on both occasions what t i denotes in the context of p, the resulting tokens, say p 0 and q 0 , should have the same truth-value, namely that of p.
Let us call such an elimination of context-dependency local disambiguation. The terms t i can be either noun-phrases or predicates. I assume here, for the sake of simplicity, extensional contexts. But this is not essential; local disambiguation makes sense in intensional settings as well 24 . The \context-insensitivity" of the terms t 0 i means that they have the same denotations throughout some wider context, which includes both that of p and of q. It does not mean that they are insensitive to context altogether Well known common examples illustrate how local disambiguation works: When`I am tall' is uttered by two speakers, only one of whom is tall, the con°ict in truth-value is resolved by using proper names. If needed, a name can be introduced by stipulation: \Let S1 be the¯rst speaker". Now, the counterfactual situation, where the two speakers use`S1' instead of`I', the two utterences have the same truth-value: that of thē rst speaker's original utterence 25 . Local disambiguation applies to all cases of indexicality (including demonstratives) and to cases of ambiguous reference, in general: for example, two tokens of:`Aristotle was married to a woman called`Jacqueline' , the¯rst in an answer to a quiz question about shipping magnates, the other | in a paper about ancient philosophers. Here, replacing`Aristotle' bỳ Aristotle Onasis' would do the redressing 26 27 .
Let us now go back and see whether such an account can¯t the situation arising from the use of`true'.
I take it for granted that our Two Line puzzle is a case of token dissent, that we do want to say that the sentence on line 1 is not true but the one on line 2 is and that, in the Jack and Jill exchange, we side with Jill against Jack. Or, to use Buridan's example 28 , if Plato 24 The di®erence being that some stronger notion of equivalence is called for: The \context-insensitive" t 0 i
should be intensionally equivalent to t i -in-the-context-of-p. 25 Instead of changing, counterfactually, the original utterences we can let the two speakers re-utter the sentence, with`I' replaced by`S1'; the natural assumption being that, in the given circumstance, an utterence and its repetition by the same speaker are equivalent. This strategy does not work if the indexical is timesensitive, unless the repetition follows su±ciently closely, so as to make the time di®erence insigni¯cant.
26 In this case the tokens can be actually changed. 27 In lumping together indexicals with cases of ambiguity I am not glossing over what distinguishes the¯rst. A systematic account of how indexicals work can be given (e.g., [Kaplan 89]); the ambiguity of`I' means that its denotation shifts according to context, but because the shift is systematic,`I' can be regarded, in one sense of \meaning", as having a¯xed meaning: it always denotes the speaker. No such account exists in general. Perhaps in the general case we can do no better than what informal pragmatics will allow us.
28 Quoted in Burge [1979] .
says, at time t: "What Aristotle says at time t is not true" and Aristotle says at time t the same about Plato, then both sayings are not true; but if a third party were to assert at time t that what Plato (or what Aristotle) says at time t is not true, his saying would be true. Evidently,`The sentence on line 1 in the Two Line puzzle refers in both tokens to the same object, be this sentence-type or sentence-token. The only possible source of discord is the predicate`true'. And if this is to be resolved by local disambiguation, then`true' in the context of line 2, denotes something di®erent than`true' in the context of line 1. But note that in our argument for the non-truth of the line 1 sentence we employed`true' in the very same sense of the`true' occuring on line 1.
29 The argument simply shows that the sentence on line 1 does not fall under what`true' in this very same sentence denotes. And if this is what we write on line 2, then the`true' on the second line has the same denotation as that on the¯rst. (Indeed, if the`true' on line 2 is construed as being on a higher level, then the sentence on line 2 is false!) This shows that the di®erence in truth-value cannot be accounted by indexicality.
Interestingly, the analysis just o®ered accords with that given by Burge [1979] in his discussion of a similar puzzle. Phrased in terms of the present puzzle, his conclusion is that the tokens of`true' on the two lines should be construed as standing for the same truthconcept. The di®erence in truth-values is traced by him to di®erent implicatures involved in evaluating the sentences. When we evaluate the line 1 sentence on the same truth-level as the`true' that occurs in it, say level i, we¯nd it non-true, i.e., non-true i ; but when we evaluate the line 2 sentence on a higher level, k, we¯nd it true, i.e., true k . But, Burge remarks, the di®erence between the tokens is illusory. Both are not true i and both are true k .
This, by the way, shows how the construal of`true' as a predicate over types leads naturally to reading the Liar as ambiguous. On my proposal, there is no ambiguity when tokens, or pointers, are the truth-value carriers; but this does not concern us right now. What is crucial for the present argument is that, whatever the alleged ambiguity and whatever the token-dependence of truth-values, it does not derive from the`true' that occurs inside the sentence, but is a product of shifts that we from the outside e®ect when we say that the sentence is, or is not, true.
Some further elaboration will be given in the discussion of Burge's work, but I think that the point about indexicality is already clear as it is.
The foregoinog argument rests on the way by which the non-truth of the line 1 sentence is derived and on what we intend to state in the sentence on line 2. But one can also argue, in general, as follows.
Let the`true' on line 1 be changed to a non-indexical`true ¤ ' that denotes once and for all what`true' in the original context denotes 30 . We thus freeze`true' in its the line-1 context.
29
The argument rests on (T1) of the \Preview": If`x is not true' is true, than x is not true. 30 Either the change is e®ected by erasing and rewriting, or we imagine a counterfactual situation in which Such a change, one feels, should not a®ect anything that has to do with truth. Saying`you are tall', while addressing Jack, and saying`Jack is tall' come to the same.
There is yet a subtle complication: By changing`true' to`true ¤ ' we have altered the reference of`the sentence on line 1'. There is thus the additional di®erence in what that noun-phrase denotes. Nonetheless, as far as truth or non-truth is concerned, this added di®erence should not matter. It might have, had the sentence said something about lexical properties. Changing \You are tall and this last utterence of mine is short" made by Jill while addressing Jack, to \Jack Horatio MacWiltington the Third is tall and this last utterence of mine is short " makes a di®erence. But with`true' instead of`short', the two come to the same. True, the analogy is not altogether complete. Having the changes in two seperate conjuncts (`you are tall' and`this last utterence of mine is true') we can argue formally by considering¯rst one, then the other. Such a procedure is not at hand when the changes are fused in the same atomic sentence. But this, I think, cannot provide any ground for taking the change of`true' to`true ¤ as a cause for truth-value change. Whoever has misgivings on this score may consider a variant of the Liar in which the sentence is, so to speak, split: Line 0: The sentence on line 1 is true. Line 1: The sentence on line 0 is not true.
Can the freezing of`true' on line 1 make a di®erence, for either the line 0 or the line 1 sentence, as far as truth is concerned? I think the answer is clearly no. Neither should an additional freezing of`true' on line 0.
Thus, in the Two Line puzzle, our ruling on the non-truth of the line 1 sentence carries over to its disambiguated ¤ -version: the ¤ -version is not true. Moreover, it is also not true ¤ ; for we can derive this in the familiar way from T1 of the \Preview" (cf. footnote ??); T1 being a minimal requirement that truth ¤ , as any truth-concept, should satisfy. When we write this true conclusion on line 2 we have repeated the ¤ -version of the line 1 sentence. The elimination of indexicality gives us back two dissenting tokens. Local disambiguation fails.
That truth is indexical is motivated by the idea of truth-levels; in particular|by the view that there are many truth concepts. That view may suggest that paradoxical phenomena are failures due to ambiguity. Which might further suggest the indexical model|this being the classical case of systematic shiftings of reference and the only one for which a precise treatment is at present available.
While my proposal breaks o® with the Tarskian model, it provides, as we saw in the \Preview", for a precise formal reconstitution of the notion of levels. We might thus say that judging the line 2 token takes place at a higher level then the gudging of its line 1 twin; for the jump rule is needed for evaluating that token but not for evaluating the one on line 1. A level-assignment to`true' can be obtained as a correlate of the general assignment of the second version is written instead of the¯rst.
ordinal numbers to pointers. The prescription is simple: Assign to the occurrence of`true' in a token of`true(p)' the ordinal number assigned to p; for this is the level that the evaluation of p reaches. In particular, the`true' on both lines is assigned level 0|the number assigned to the line 1 token. But were we to write on a third line`the sentence on line 2 is true' (or not true'), that`true' would get level 1. Thus, the shift to higher level is not in what thè true' inside the tokens denotes, but in the way that we from the outside judge them.
Occasionally, truth-levels are indicated by attaching subscripts to`true'. This would be harmless, provided that we are not misled to see in these subscripts, or indice|as they are also called, some form of indexicality. The indices play no role in determining truthvalue, but come after the fact, as a kind of annotation to a¯nished process, an underlining of certain aspects of the evaluation. While the reference of`I' is picked, through the indexicality mechanism, from the multitude of humans, nothing of the kind obtains in the case of`true'. There is no preexisting multitude, or hierarchy, of truth concepts, out of which we pick the concept we invoke. The hierarchy is created by the evaluation process itself, by the very act of judging, by the linguistic exchange.
The failure of local disambiguation re°ects that aspect of linguistic activity whereby sentence-tokens function as the units of the exchange. The meaning of a token is not reducible to what the sentence says, even when the denotations of its terms have been¯xed. It derives also from the token's particular place in the network.
The principle, under other forms and on di®erent scales, is quite common. An event, an assertion, a work of art might mean whatever it means by virtue of its place in a global system of similar events, acts or works. Duchamp's famous urinal refers to the whole previous tradition of art exhibitions. The reference, though not formal and not explicit, is there. For the place of that particular display within the historic network of art is what endowes Duchamp's exhibit with artistic meaning. Moreover, it would be erroneous to derive this meaning from the urinal itself, as if it were an \indexical" that indicates di®erent things in di®erent contexts. Quite the contrary. That object means or connotes, within the displaying event, whatever a urinal means or connotes in everyday life. Only by retaining its ordinary, undigni¯ed status, can it cause the surprise, the outrage and the joke, which constitute the aesthetics of the display.
We can now take stock and assess the extent to which pointer semantics departs from a type-based one. The formal system underlying the present proposal excludes indexicals, or any kind of ambiguity. Hence we can take the extent of pointer dissent (i.e. of pointers to the same sentence-type that get di®erent truth-values) as a sort of measure. Now, the results LPD and HLD mentioned in the \Preview" yield a very simple picture, perhaps surprisingly simple|given that it holds for full¯rst-order logic and arbitrary pointer networks: Whenever pointers dissent, one of them has the value GAP and the other, which has a standard value, is one level higher in the linguistic hierarchy. Informally, we can say that departure from type-based semantics occurs just when a pointer fails to \express something", while another at a higher level succeeds in expressing it 31 . Thus, departure takes place when a necessary ascent in the linguistic hierarchy cannot be accomodated within Tarskian semantics or any of its o®shoots; and here I include Kripke's system and all its variants. In such systems the ascent can be represented only as a change of language. Its accomodation within a single language, which is what the present framework does, requires a price and the results show that we are paying the minimum 32 .
While the semantic paradoxes have focused a great amount of research, resulting in an extended and often sophisticated literature, they have not been at the centre of the research program of natural language semantics. This is understandable, given the tangle of problems encountered in the rather elementary stages of the investigation. To give the semantics of true' while we are far from clear on that of`event', or that of mass terms, might seem a luxury 33 . But the tendency to regard the problems raised by the paradoxes as something esotheric, to be handled later (if at all) when more basic aspects have been clari¯ed, is, I think, an error. We are not concerned here with marginal brain-teasers, but with an essential feature of language.`True' is the paradigm of a network-creating predicate. It can send us, via`what she said',`whatever he asserted',`what is written on page 1' and their like, from John to Joan, from Joan to Jack, to Jill, to McX, and so on; the tour is unrestricted and sometimes endless.`Know' (in the sense of \know that") and`believe' (in the sense of \believe that") have similar potential:`I know what she knows',`what he believes I doubt'. But`true' is the more fundamental 34 . It is no wonder that problems arising out of this chain-forming capacity have surfaced in the theoretical research of Arti¯cial Intelligence. Once it is realized that knowledge, or belief, are to be modeled as predicates rather than as sentential operants 35 , the semantics of`true' becomes relevant in the contexts of knowledge and belief representation 36 .
31 In this respect, all such cases are like the simple Two Line example. However, the sentence in question can be as complex as any¯rst-order sentence and the failure can be caused by an extremely intricate loop. Moreover it can occur at any level, the ordinal of which can be of any cardinality not exceeding that of the total network. 32 I should, however, add that it is conceivable that in more sophisticated variants of the algorithm LPD will fail. I see no reason why LPD, pleasing as it is, should be imposed as a prerequisite on evaluation procedures in general. With indexicals present, di®erent tokens of the same sentence may get di®erent non-GAP truth-values. That a similar phenomenon may arise because of deeper reasons, deriving from the use of`true', is not to be ruled out.
33 Using the concept of truth in order to give semantics in the form of truth conditions, as was proposed by Davidson, is of course quite di®erent from giving the semantics of`true' itself.
34 Note how often`know', and to some extent`believe', ride on the back of`true'. We might say`I know that what she says is true', but we cannot say`I know that what she says', while`I know what she says' means something di®erent. Knowledge-modalities like K J (x), which are used in formal systems, are rendered into natural language by invoking`true' or an equivalent expression:`J knows that x is true' or`J knows that x is the case'.
35 Sentnetial operants are too restrictive:`John knows something that Bill does not know' is inexpressible if`know' is treated as a sentential operant.
36 Thus, Morgestern [1986] and Kremmer [86] draw on Kripke's model, while Asher and Kamp, [1986] , follow the constructions of Gupta and Herzberger. Among other works, motivated by problems of self-
Apropos Propositions
Some would have it that truth and falsity attach to propositions (or statements) | entities from which linguistic particulars have been abstracted away. There is, however, no agreed view on the nature of these objects and the di±culties surrounding the concept may incline us to consider, at least provisionally, less problematic creatures. In any case and however propositions are conceived, the crucial question is that of relating them to linguistic constructs; to sentences, for example. On the present view, the question takes the form: what proposition, or statement 37 , is expressed by a pointer? I have suggested in the \Preview" that, prima facie, a pointer can be taken to express whatever is expressed by the sentence it points to, except for failed pointers|those marked by GAP. On this suggestion, non-failed pointers to the same sentence express the same thing. Since (by LPD) such pointers get, invariably, the same truth-value, we will not run into trouble, as far as truth-values are concerned. The plausibility of the suggestion rests, however, not on LPD, but rather on its proof, which shows the folowing: Whenever p and q are non-failed pointers to the same sentence, their evaluation requires the same sequence of necessary steps, ending at a stage where each can be assigned the same truth-value by applying the same rule 38 . All this is a far cry from determining when di®erent pointers express the same thing; the criterion given is su±cient but certainly not necessary. But it seems that an account that correlates propositions with setences could be extended to pointers. The heuristics would be as follows: Two non-GAP pointers express the same proposition, inasmuch as this can be said of the sentences they point to.
The propositions to be gotten along the suggested lines are \ontological", rather than \epistemic". A person stating what to him is a perfectly clear thought might fail to express a proposition, because unwittingly he has involved himself in some loop. A similar phenomenon reference in epistemic contexts, are [Asher 88, 90] 37 There is considerable overlap in the use of the two terms and I am not altogether certain as to the \right" one. There is a usage, which I do not follow, whereby propositions are taken as the meanings of declarative sentence-types, including indexical ones. By contrast, statements are attached to particular utterences. However, in the tradition deriving from Frege and Russell, the proposition expressed, say, by`it is now raining' changes according to time. Read thus, propositions can be associated with sentence-types only after the sentences have been converted, by elimination of context-sensitive items, into \eternal" versions. What is then the di®erence between this notion of a proposition and the notion of a statement as advocated by Austin and Strawson? It appears that propositions are pre-linguistic entities, existing in their own right, whereas a statement is something one makes by producing a linguistic token. Put bluntly, if there were no people, there would have been no statements but there would have been propositions. Striping them of their more metaphysical aspects, one can say that propositions are possible statements. And this is how I propose to view them here. I have opted for`proposition', because usually this, rather than`statment', is employed when a formal treatment is intended. Thus, in [BE 87 ], a formal model of so-called Austinian propositions is proposed for what Austin called statements. Indeed, if propositions are possible statements, then the general theory of statements is the theory of propositions.
38 Were we to use another version of the evaluation procedure, a similar analysis of the procedure would be required in order to justify stipulations about \expressing the same thing". obtains in some current theories of propositions, whereby certain terms (the so-called directly refering ones) are taken to introduce their very references as components of the proposition 39 . Mistaken beliefs about the reference may lead to a person's expressing a proposition di®erent from what he intended. And when a term of the directly refering kind fails to refer, no proposition is expressed.
But nothing prevents us, at least not in principle, from considering other kinds of propositions, aimed at re°ecting¯ner shades of meaning. Just as, for various purposes, it is natural to hide the reference-picking machinery of certain terms, it might be desirable, for other purposes, to expose it in the proposition. In the present case, a move to more epistemic propositions might entail distinctions between various gap pointers. The gap constituted by the line 1 sentence derives from a contingent fact: the place where the sentence is written. Someone might have put it there because of a mistaken belief about line numbers 40 . By contrast, the loop produced by`What I am saying at this very moment is not true' cannot be amended by moving utterences to di®erent locations. Whatever the speaker might have intended (assuming he knows the language) it is not expressed by the utterence taken at face value. In the present formalism the two cases are not distinguished; both are construed as a pointer, p, which points to :Tr(p). The distinction can be introduced at the cost of additional structure; for example, a set of possible pointing functions in addition to the actual one 41 .
Finally, it can be argued that some meaning is expressed even in the case of noncontingent gaps. For a pointer provides a prescription for computing truth-values. It amounts to a kind of algorithm. And as an algorithm it makes sense even when it leads inevitably to a non-terminating computation.
While not endorsing, at least initially, any particular position concerning propositions, the present proposal incorporates a certain methodology: Go into propositions after having clari¯ed su±ciently the rules and mechanisms governing truth-value assignments. Only then can we tailor our propositions, if and when we introduce them, to¯t the desired aspects of meaning. To do otherwise is to commit ourselves to a preconceived concept of propositions, deriving from some metaphysics or some given frame, prejudging thereby the issues at hand. An opposite approach underlies the work of Barwise and Etchemendy, [1987] , on some aspects of which I shall now comment brie°y 42 .
39 Cf. [Kaplan 89] . 40 In an example of Prior [1961] , used by Burge, a student who thinks he is in room 9 writes on the blackboard:`Whatever is written on the blackboard in room 10 is false', expressing thereby his true belief. It turns out that he himself is in room 10.
41 Distinctions of similar nature, between kinds of pointing, are used in certain more sophisticated variants of the evaluation procedure, aimed at reducing black holes.
42 An already condensed passage concerning their work, had to be further abridged for reasons of space. An evaluation of their work, which naturally should address the wider perspective of situation semantics, is, Barwise and Etchemendy propose formal models of propositions, constructed according to situation semantics and classi¯ed into Russellian propositions and so-called Austinian ones (the second type is the one they prefer). One of their goals is to include in the model what they call cyclic propositions: those involving self-reference. And their ingenious idea is to employ, for that purpose, AFA (set theory with Aczell's Anti-Foundation Axiom) | a theory of non-well-founded sets which accomodates, naturally, a variety of \cyclic creatures".
While the BE (Barwise-Etchemendy) framework assigns truth-values to propositions, it does not provide guidelines, let alone a procedure, for assigning truth-values to sentences| either types or tokens. For when it comes to determining what proposition is expressed by an utterence, a kind of free parameter enters 43 . In cases of self-references there is considerable lattitude; much is up to the interpreter, who can toggle truth-values by adjusting that parameter in various ways. Such utterences are thus construed as ambiguous. Presumably, Barwise and Etchemendy regard the question of disambiguation, which will lead to the determination of truth-values, as belonging to some branch of pragmatics.
It can be shown that the assignment of truth-values, according to intuitions formalized in the semantics of pointers, is outside the scope of the BE framework. For the needed distinctions cannot be made in AFA 44 . Can we correlate with sentence-tokens propositions, of the BE kind, whose truth-values match the values derived by pointer semantics? This is possible to some extent. In general, it requires the removal of certain restrictions underlying the BE modeling of propositions. Perhaps this is an artifact of the BE modeling; in any case it is a technical point to which I shall not enter here 45 . The major non-technical point on which the BE framework is at odds with pointer semantics is that it does not make place for the notion|central to the present proposal|of a failed utterence. The BE setup provides the Liar and its kin with circular propositions, which I do not¯nd objectionable, as long as we mark such propositions by GAP. However, Barwise and Etchemendy, construing`false' as false 2 (i.e. as not being true) regard these propositions simply as being false. I argued in the \Preview" that this cannot be considered more than a terminological blurring of truth-value gaps. It is also, I think, at odds with of course, not intended here.
43 Namely, the situation (in the technical sense of situation semantics) associated with the utterence, whose choice is left to us.
44 For example, AFA does not provide for the distinction between the sentence-tokens on lines 1 and 2 in the Two Line puzzle; the two nodes in¯gure 2 of the \Preview" represent the same set, namely: the unique set containing 1 as its sole member. This is forced by the extensionality axiom. 45 In the BE framework propositions are about situations, the choice of which involves a considerable degree of freedom, especially in self-referential cases. However, in disjunctive (or conjunctive) propositions, all the disjuncts (or conjuncts) must be about the same situation|which is also the situation the whole disjunction (or conjujction)is about. This can imply counterintuitive consequences: In a disjunction S 1 _ S 2 , where S 1 is a Liar sentence and S 2 is a sentence saying that S 1 is not true, both disjuncts must be about the same situation, which causes the second disjunct, and along with it the whole disjuction, to be non-true. In the evaluation procedure this disjunction (i.e., a token, or some pointer to it) gets the value T because the second disjunct does.
Austin, who devoted much e®ort to the taxonomy of failures and who distinguished failures caused by illegitimate self-reference from mere self-contradiction 46 Failure to distinguish failure can be a source of confusion. I think that it gives rise to some philosophical red herrings in the BE framework; but for reasons of length I cannot elaborate on this here (cf. footnote ??).
Three Previous Accounts
I shall discuss three account related to my proposal, those of Parsons, [1974] |which can be seen as a development of a theme in Russell [1908] , Burge [1979] , and Skyrms [1982] and his earlier 1970 papers. These accounts do not assign truth-values to sentence-tokens, but they share with the present work the view that places the Strong Liar and its kin at the heart of the semantic paradoxes. Needless to say, I have no intention to review the vast literature devoted to the Liar. The choice of these works is dictated by their relevance to my proposal and re°ects no attempt at ranking.
Ambiguity and Interpretation Schemes
Parsons proposes to view the Liar and its kin as cases in which di®erent interpretation schemes, based on di®erent truth concepts, apply to the same sentence (type). No formal explication is given to \interpretation scheme", but a certain direction is suggested by rewriting`A is true' as:`there exists a proposition P such that A expresses P and P is true'. The interpretation scheme is then determined by¯xing the domain of propositions over which the quanti¯ed P ranges. This proposal goes back to Russell [1908] , who suggested that the paradox arises from an attempt to quantify over \too many propositions" and is to be resolved by restricting the quanti¯er ranges. This solution underlies his theory of types and blocks also the set-theoretical paradoxes. Since there can be many natural domains of propositions, the sentence turns out to be ambiguous. Whatever the domain, it cannot include the proposition expressed by the Liar sentence itself.
Intuitively, the interpretation scheme re°ects the comprehensiveness of the point of view from which the assignment of truth-value is made. In the case of our Two Line example, the sentnece on line 1 fails to express a proposition, under the¯rst \straightforward" interpretation; but under a second scheme, which takes into account the previous failure, the sentence is seen to be true. Parsons does not give an account of how the interpretation is determined, except for noting that it is determined by the circumstances of the sentence's utterance.
46 \Those of the so-called`logical paradoxes'... which concern`true' and`false' are not to be reduced to cases of self-contradiction, any more than`S but I do not believe it' is. A statement to the e®ect that it is itself true is every bit as absurd as the one to the e®ect that it is itself false. There are other types of sentence which o®end against the fundamental conditions of all communication in ways distinct from the way in which`This is red and this is not red' o®ends..." , in [Austin 1950 ], footnote on page 129 in the Oxford University Paperback edition.
He proposes to regard this ambiguity in the same light as the ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of quanti¯ers or the use of expressions such as`say' or`mean'.
Given the analysis of section ??, that ambiguity is now seen to derive not from some ambiguity of`true' that occurs in the Liar sentence, but from the di®erent points of view that we|the interpreters|can adopt from the \outside" with regard to it. Parsons suggested, in a 1982 postscript, Burge's indexical conception of`true' as a way of explicating the interpretation-scheme picture. But it appears that this would not do justice to his ideas. Indexicality falls short of accounting for the phenomena at hand. Indeed, as the analysis of Burge's setup will show, the real work there is done by assuming some mechanism of implicatures. Now, pointer semantics can provide a kind of backup for the concept of interpretation scheme. For one can regard di®erent pointers to the same sentence as expressing various interpretations of it. There remains however the essential di®erence that my setup is based on construing`true' as a predicate over tokens (or, more generally, pointers) and, doing so, it leaves no place for ambiguity. Truth-values are determined by the evaluation procedure. The token on line 1 is de¯nitively not true (and not false either) the token on line 2 de¯nitely is.
There are other systems that can provide formal backups for the ambiguity picture . The constructions of Gupta [1982] and Herzberger [1982] , whereby the Liar changes its truthvalue according to the evaluation stage, give rise to such a picture. And the more recent [BE 87], discussed above, provides another modeling of ambiguity. It is indeed directly related to the Russellian idea, for it models, among the rest, so-called Russellian propositions. (As can be expected, no indexicality of`true' plays a role in any of these setups.)
While these models do not solve the Two Line puzzle, they solve or illuminate what we might call the One Line puzzle:
A philosopher contemplates the sentence on line 1, which says of itself that it is not true. At¯rst he deduces that the sentence is not true; realizing on second re°ection that the sentence itself \says this", he deduces that the sentence is true after all. He may continue the process to the third round, whereby the sentence becomes non-true, then in the fourth round it is true again, and so on.
Burge's Proposal
I have already discussed in section ?? the indexical construal of`true'. Here I shall con¯ne myself to more speci¯c details of Burge's work. His proposed setup comes in two parts. Thē rst consists in a formal language containing a family of truth predicates, true i , i = 0; 1; : : :, arranged in a Tarski-like hierarchy, with subscripts denoting the levels. Each predicate is to serve as a truth predicate for the portion of the language \below it", that is to say, for all sentence-types containing truth predicates with a strictly smaller index. Yet each predicate takes as arguments all sentence-names of the language. Because of self-reference there are, for each i, sentences that inevitably fail to get a truth i -value: neither the sentence nor its negation are true i . The idea is to regulate the assignment of truth i -values so as to approxi-and di®erent one obtains. Assume, for example, that`true' in the line 1 sentence in our old puzzle 52 has been indexed by i. This sentence is an evaluating sentence for itself (recall, that here we are concerned with sentence-types). By the initial implicature, when we assert that the sentence is not true we are in fact asserting that it is not true i ; which, indeed, it is not. But when we go on and evaluate this very assertion, the same implicature rules again that we use`true i '. We should therefore judge our assertion, written say as a sentnece on line 2, as non-true. This unwelcome result is avoided by having the implicature cancelled and raising the level of the second evaluation to some k, greater than i. As Burge sees it, the move from line 1 to line 2 signi¯es a switch from one implicature to another. The change of truth-value is only apparent, both are true k and not true i .
What Burge fails to observe is that the resort to implicatures voids the indexing of its signi¯cance. Not only the Liar, but all problematic cases of self-reference, require implicature switches. Thus, in the Plato-Aristotle example quoted from Buridan (cf. section ??), thè true' in both sayings gets the same index (a conclusion endorsed by Burge on the grounds of symmetry) resulting in both not being true. If a third party were to assert that Plato's, or Aristotle's, saying is not true, his saying would be true. But this can be sustained only if the implicature employed in judging the¯rst two assertions, is changed when judging the third. Or take the Nixon-Dean example, where each says of the other that all his utterences concerning Watergate are not true. If, except that assertion, all other Watergate assertions made by either are not true, a loop is created and we can say that these two assertions are not true. Again, the implicature must be changed when judging our assertion; because when the Nixon's and Dean's sayings are spelled out as conjunctions, our assertion is seen to repeat a conjunct from each.
In fact, whenever the jump rule is used in the evaluation procedure, an implicature must be canceled in favour of a di®erent one that shifts the level of`true' in the evaluating sentence. Since the shifts are cummulative, a count must be kept to determine the \right implicature" for choosing the level; and the level can be any¯nite or in¯nite ordinal. Burge ignores all this. Having introduced implicature in the analysis of the Liar, he goes on in the second half of the paper to discuss the strati¯ed language and indexing, without mentioning the matter again.
The process of implicature shifts is altogether obscure; no guideline, nor any indication, is given. But there lies the real problem; for knowing the mechanism that governs implicature choice is almost like knowing the evaluation procedure. It is this mechanism that does the real work. Indexicality rests idle.
The Intensional Conception
The analogy between an intensional case and a Strong Liar, on which Skyrms draws, is as follows 53 : That the sum of 7 and 2 is odd is necessary, that the number of planets is odd is not|even though the sum of 7 and 2 is the number of planets; just so, the sentence on line 2 is true, the sentence on line 1 is not|even though the sentence on line 2 is the sentence on line 1. Skyrms proposes to solve the Strong Liar by construing`true' as intensional.
Truth-values are to be assigned to sentence-types under descriptions. Under the descriptioǹ the sentence on line 2' the sentence is true, under the description`the sentence on line 1' it is not. Formally, Skyrms proposes to assign truth values to sentence-description pairs, (s; d), where d is a description of the sentence-type s, and to do so in a way analogous to Kripke's xed point construction. He shows that, given a partial valuation of sentence-description pairs (that may distinguish between pairs that di®er only in the description coordinate), a variant of Kripke's construction can be used to extend it. Skyrms' construction falls short of the desired goal since, being based on (the analogues of) Kripke's rules, it does not have the gap and jump rules, which are crucial. It works as long as we are moving through standard values; e.g., if we have already assigned (s; d) the value T, we can go on and assign (s 0 ; d 0 ) the value F, where s 0 is the negation of s and d 0 is some appropriate description obtained from d. But it does not provide a way for assigning T to the token on line 2 (i.e., to the pair (s; d), where s is the sentence and d is the description`the sentence on line 2'). In general, it falls short whenever the jump rule is invoked. Now, if desired, one can regard the pair (s; d) as a pointer to s. And, vice versa, a pointer to s can be changed to a pair (s; d) where d is some description derived from the pointer. Formally, my algorithm can be viewed as providing a truth-value assignment to sentences under descriptions, achieving thereby Skyrms' goal 54 . However, I do not see how the failure of substitutivity arising in the Strong Liar puzzle can be accounted by intensionality, without stretching \intensionality" so as to render it uninteresting. For, by the same token, one could subsume under it all other context dependent phenomena, including for example indexicality. When each of Jack and Jill says : \I am tall" then, assuming that only Jack is tall, the two utterences get di®erent truth-values; we could explain that by the intensionality of`true', namely: the sentence`I am tall' is true, under the description`the sentence uttered by Jack', but not true under the description`the sentence uttered by Jill'. I doubt that we want to adopt this picture.
Intensionality has to do with the way in which referring terms pick their references. The sum of 7 and 2 must be the number 9, but it is only a cosmic accident, or so we think, that 9 is also the number of planets. The intensional e®ect disappears if the referential connection is made explicit: Given that the number of planets is the sum of 7 and 2, it is necessary that the number of planets is odd. Or, given that George IV knew that the author of Waverly was Scott, it is inconceivable that he wondered whether Scott wrote Waverly. But can we say that, given that the sentence-type on line 2 is the sentence-type on line 1, the sentence on line 1 is true? Certainly not. Nothing in the Liar situation hinges on some unclarity in the referential picture; bringing all the links into the open does not make a di®erence.
Viewed in retrospect, both the conception of truth: as indexical or as an intensional notion, are attempts to account for phenomena arising out of Liar-like paradoxes by using tools that fall essentially within the framework of traditional logic. Both come short of providing a solution, but for di®erent reasons.
